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[Sac. No. 6136.
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Apr. 24, 1952.]

ARVID G. ANDERSON et al., Respondents, v. JOHN J.
SOUZA et al., Appellants.
[1] Landlord and Tenan1r-Liability for Injuries to Third Persons.
-A landlord is not responsible to other parties for the misconduct or injurious acts of his tenant to whom his estate has
been leased for a lawful and proper purpose when there is
no nuisance or illegal structure on it at the time of the leasing.
[2] Aeronautics- Airports- Operation of Property.-Evidence
that owner of land constructed airfield, obtained a county
permit, used the field for his own private plane, controlled
the hangars and tie-down space from which he collected rent,
and that lessee operated a flying school, sold gas and repaired
planes, sustains finding that both owner and lessee operated
a private airport.
[3] !d.-Airports-Ownership and Operation of Airplanes.-Testimony of owner of airport land that he owned and operated
a plane and lessee's testimony that he owned and operated
four airplanes, plus one which he operated for another owner,
sustains finding that "many airplanes" operating from the airport were owned and operated by the landowner and lessee.
[ 4] Witnesses-Refreshing Recollection-Use of Memorandum.A witness may read from a memorandum which constitutes
a permanent record of a series of incidents observed by him
over a long period of time respecting which he made notations
in various forms at the time of each happening and which he
later copied in a permanent form in the memorandum in question. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2047.)
[5] !d.-Refreshing Recollection-Sufficiency of Memorandum.When a witness testified under oath that he made a copy of
something, such testimony is equivalent to a statement that
the copy was correctly made as it would not be a copy if it were
not correct.
[6] !d.-Refreshing Recollection-Use of Memorandum.-A witness may testify from a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, when the writing was prepared
[1] See Cal.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, § 150; Am.Jur., Landlord
and Tenant, §§ 755, 762.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Landlord and Tenant, § 316; [2, 3,
8, 10-13, 17-22, 24] Aeronautics, § 5; [ 4, 6, 7] Witnesses, § 113;
[5] Witnesses, § 115; [9] Injunctions, § 27; [14, 23] Aeronautics,
§ 1.1; [15] Nuisances, § 32; [16] Nuisances,§ 60.
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by him, or under his direction, at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when
the fact was fresh in his memory, and he knew that the same
was correctly stated in the writing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2047.)
[7] !d.-Refreshing Recollection-Use of Memorandum.-Where
a memorandum fails to refresh the recollection of a witness,
there is only one way in which he can testify "from the writing" and that is by reading it verbatim. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2047.)
[8] Aeronautics-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-Injunctive relief
may be granted to property owners contiguous to an airport
where the damages for annoyance and disturbance caused
by low flying airplanes cannot be measured. ( Civ. Code,
§ 3422.)
[9] Injunctions- Grounds for Relief- Irreparable Injury.-'rhe
term "irreparable injury" authorizing the interposition of a
eourt of equity by way of injunction means that species of
damages, whether great or small, which ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other.
[10] Aeronautics- Airports- Operation as Nuisance.- Finding
that operation of airport and usual and normal flight of incoming and outgoing planes constitutes a continuing private nuisance to adjacent prior residents of the immediate area is
supported by evidence that there are from 50 to 150 flights
daily; that the planes in taking off and in landing are very low,
some of thPm 10 to 20 feet above the ground as they approach
or leave the landing strip; that the noise has destroyed the
peace of the adjacent homes making it impossible to get adequate sleep, drowning out normal conversation, and making
it impossible to use the radio or the telephone; and that the
noise and low flights combined have frightened children to an
hysterical extent, have scared the women, making them
nervous and impaired their health.
[11] !d.-Airports-Operation as Nuisance.-An airport is not a
nuisance per se, but it may be a nuisance because of unsuitable
location or improper operation or both. (State Aeronautics
Com. Act, § 2(d); 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 151a.)
[12] Id.- Airports- Injunctive Relief.- Since injunctive processes are prospective in operation, legislatiop regulating the
establishment and operation of airfields and declaring the
public policy with respect to aviation is applicable to a suit,
pending but undecided on the date of the legislative enactment, wherein it was sought to enjoin continued operation of
[11] Airport or flight of aircraft as a nuisance, note, 140 A.L.R.
1362. See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Aircraft, § 4; Am.Jur. (rev. ed.)
Aviation, § 29.
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an airport on the ground that it was a private nuisance, and
the scope and nature of any injunction in that case will be
limited by such legislation.
[13] Id.-Airports-Licensing.-The licensing of an airport by
the State Aeronautics Commission does not confer the right
so to operate the airport as to constitute a private nuisance
to surrounding property owners.
[14] Id.-Rights in Airspace and in Surface of SoiL-Owners of
surface of soil are not divested of the lawful rights incident
to such ownership by reason of the declaration of Congress
that United States possesses and exercises complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air above the United States
(49 U.S.C.A. § 176a), nor by the declaration of the state Legislature that sovereignty in the space above the lands rests in
the state except where gTanted to and assumed by the United
States pursuant to constitutional grant from the people of
the state. (State Aeronautics Com. Act, § 2(b); 1 Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 151a.)
[15] Nuisances- Equitable Relief-Abatement.-Regulatory provisions of State Aeronautics Commission Act (1 Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 151a) and federal laws regulating flying and
airports (49 U.S.C.A. § 176a) do not supplant the ancient
common law and long-established statute law declaring that
nuisances may be abated at the suit of those injured thereby.
[16] !d.-Equitable Relief-Scope.-Injunctive process ought not
to go beyond the necessities of the case and where a legitimate
business is being eonducted and in the conduct thereof a nuisance is created and being maintained, the relief granted
should be directed and confined to elimination of the nuisance,
unless under the peculiar circumstances of the case the business, lawful in itself, cannot be conducted without creating
a nuisance and violating the rights of contiguous property
owners.
[17] Aeronautics-Airports-Nature.-Establishment of a private
airport does not require a finding by any public agency of
public convenience and necessity.
[18] Id.- Airports- Mode of Conducting Business.-A private
airfield, having no power of condemnation, cannot conduct
its business in such a manner as to deprive others of their
property rights and thereby, in practical effect, condemn the
property of others in violation of constitutional guarantees.
[19] !d.-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-Notwithstanding the public policy encouraging the establishment and operation of airports and the furtherance of aviation, the operation of a pri[15] See Cal.Jur., Nuisances, § 39; Am.Jur., Nuisances, § 146.
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vate airport is a private business and, like any other private
business, operations which create a nuisance may be enjoined.
[20] !d.-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-In the absence of evidence
that airplanes cannot fly to and from a private airport at
sufficient altitude to eliminate the nuisance of low flying with
its resultant noise and danger to adjacent residential property
owners, an injunction to cease operations of the. field cannot
be sustained on findings that a private continuing nuisance
exists by reason of the low flying of incoming and outgoing
airplanes with attendant noise and danger.
[21] !d.-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-In action to enjoin operation of an airport on ground that its operation constitutes
a nuisance, burden is on plaintiffs to prove that no planes
could fly to and from the airfield at proper elevations.
[22] Id.- Airports-Rights of Contiguous Owners.-Contiguous
property owners must to a reasonable degTee yield their desired
privacy to the general welfare which is contributed to by the
legitimate operation of a private airport.
[23] !d.-Rights in Airspace and in Surface of SoiL-Where it is
shown that a runway is too short to permit airplanes to
descend over contiguous property without invading the lawful
right of the surface owner to the air above his holdings, the
flights constitute unlawful acts.
[24] !d.-Airports-Injunctive Relief.-An injunction forbidding
all operations from a private airport cannot be sustained unless
it is shown that the imposition of appropriate limitations will,
by reason of the shortness of the runway and the prevailing
flying conditions, make it impossible for the airfield to be
operated in a normal and usual manner.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. H. L. Chamberlain, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part with directions.
Action for damages for maintenance of nuisance through
operation of an airport, and for injunctive relief. Judgment
for plaintiffs reversed as to plaintiffs C. H. Terry, Oma Terry,
H. B. Fletcher, Dorothy Fletcher, \Villiam T. Harrison, Grace
Harrison, Frank Baba and Zale Wooters; part of judgment
awarding damages affirmed as to other plaintiffs; part of
judgment enjoining defendants from operating airport reversed with directions.
Donald B. Fowler and H. E. Gleason for Appellants.
Brown, Brown & Bacon, Ralph M. Brown, William E. Bacon
and T. M. Norton for Respondents.
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THE COURT.-This appeal is from a judgment enjoining
the operation of an airport and awarding damages. After
decision by the District Court of Appeal, Third Appellate
District, a hearing was granted by this court to give further
consideration to the important issues involved. We have
concluded that the opinion of the District Court of Appeal,
prepared by Mr. Justice Van Dyke, correctly discussed and
decided the issues presented. That opinion, with additions
and deletions, is adopted as the opinion of this court. As
modified, the opinion is as follows :
"Plaintiffs below, more than 50 in number, brought this
action against defendants to recover damages by reason of
the alleged creation and maintenance of a nuisance through
the operation of an airport, and for injunctive relief forbidding the defendants to operate the airport as such. The
court, adopting in the main the allegations of the complaint,
made the following findings of fact: That since April 19,
1946, plaintiffs were the owners of and resided on real property located close to the airport; that during that period of
time the defendants operated the airport, defendants Souza
and wife being the owners of the real property on which the
airport is located; that in the course of the operation of the
airport numerous aircraft of various types taxi, take off,
circle, buzz, cruise about, maneuver, glide, climb, bank, turn,
stunt and engage in acrobatics, and land on, from, and to
said airport; that this aerial activity is continuous and frequent throughout the daylight hours and that the aircraft are
operating with the consent, encouragement and solicitation
of the defendants; that many of the airplanes so operated
belong to defendants and are operated by them; that the airplanes fly over the homes of the plaintiffs at heights varying
from 25 to 800 feet and in passing over or near said homes
create such a tremendous noise that the same interferes with
the lawful use, enjoyment and occupancy of the dwellings
to the great disturbance and nervous upset of the plaintiffs;
that because of said noises plaintiffs and members of their
families are unable to sleep when planes from the airport
are operating, to their great physical detriment and mental
anguish ; that normal conversation is interrupted; that plaintiffs have great difficulties listening to radio programs and in
general the enjoyment of their homes is material1y decreased;
that plaintiffs, knowing that numerous airplane accidents
have occurred throughout the country and that several have
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occurred at the airport, suffer great fear and apprehension
when the airplanes pass over their homes at low altitudes;
that defendant Earlandson operates a flying school at the
airport, and the student pilots using airplanes belonging to
Earlandson fly at low altitudes over plaintiffs' homes, but
that only six plaintiffs were affected by the conduct of the
student pilots and that, as to the six, such conduct placed
their lives and property in great jeopardy and caused them
to fear greatly for their property, their lives and the lives
of their loved ones; that the real property of the same six
plaintiffs by reason of said conditions has depreciated in
value, but that this was not true as to the other plaintiffs;
that plaintiffs have often requested and demanded of defendants that they cease operating the airport and the airplanes
in the manner found, but that defendants have continued to
operate them in said manner continuously from April, 1946,
to the time of trial; that more airplanes are operating from
the field each month and that still more airplanes will operate from the field in the future ; that defendants by their
acts have caused irreparable injury to plaintiffs and that
irreparable injury will be done to them in the future if the
defendants continue with their acts as found; that none of
the plaintiffs have been damaged except the same six and
that they have been damaged as follows, V. E. Anderson
and wife jointly in the sum of $500, Arvid G. Anderson and
wife jointly in the same sum, and Jack Harlan and wife
jointly in the same sum ; that plaintiffs have no plain, speedy
or adequate remedy at law. As conclusions of law from the
facts found judgment was ordered: 1. Enjoining and restraining the defendants from operating the airport on the
premises described in the complaint; 2. For damages in the
sum of $500 to each of the three couples named above. Judgment was entered accordingly. Motion for new trial was made
and denied. From the judgment the defendants have taken
this appeal.
"vVe shall discuss the contentions of appellants seriatim
as they advance them in their briefs. Appellants first attack
the finding of the court that appellants Souza and wife, along
with appellant Earlandson, operate the airport. Herein it
is claimed on behalf of Souza that it is Earlandson who operates the airport and that Souza, while he owns the property
where the airport is located, has leased the airport to Earlandson, and that, therefore, under such cases as Gould v. Stafford,
91 Cal. 146 [27 P. 543], Wiersma v. City of Long Beach,

Apr. 1952]

ANDERSON

v. SouzA

831

(38 C.2d 825; 243 P.2d 4971

41 Cal.App.2d 8 [106 P.2d 45], Mundt v. Nowlin, 44 Cal.
App.2d 414 [112 P.2d 782], and Meloy v. C·ity of Santa Monica, 124 Cal.App. 622 [12 P.2d 1072], the nuisance complained
of is created and maintained by Earlandson alone. [1] These
cases lay down the well-known rule that a landlord is not
responsible to other parties for the misconduct or injurious
acts of his tenant to whom his estate has been leased for a
lawful and proper purpose when there is no nuisance or illegal structure upon it at the time of the leasing. [2] We
think, however, that in view of the evidence here this rule
and the cases declaring it are not controlling, for it was
shown that Souza owned the land, constructed the field, obtained the county permit, flew his own plane from and to
the field and retained portions of the field's facilities, that is,
the hangars and tie-down space for which he collected rent.
Earlandson 's rights were to operate his flying school, sell
gas and repair planes. Earlandson, therefore, was not in
sole charge of the field and it is a fair inference from the
evidence that Souza at least joined with Earlandson in permitting public use of the field, and, in short, so participate~
in the operation of the field that the court's findings that he
1
and Earlandson operated the field are substantially supported j
by the evidence.
,
/
[3] "There is next attacked the finding that 'many airplanes' operating from the airport were owned and operated
by appellants Souza and Earlandson as being contrary to the
evidence. We think this finding is sufficiently supported by
Souza's testimony that he owned and operated a plane and
by Earlandson's testimony that he owned and operated four
airplanes, plus one which he operated for another owner.
\Vhether such numbers constitute many or few is a comparative matter, but Earlandson 's planes were shown to have
been greatly used in the conduct of his air school and in view
of the fact of dual control and operation of the port by the
two men we find nothing erroneous in the challenged finding. . . .
"Appellants contend that the court erred in decreeing any
judgment either for damages or by way of injunctive relief
against defendant Souza. This is but another aspect of the
contention previously discussed, which was based upon the
theory that Souza, having leased the airport, did not operate
the same, and we think separate treatment is unnecessary.
·what we have said heretofore disposes of this contention.
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[4] "Appellants contend that the court erred in allowing one of the respondents to testify from and read verbatim
into the record a memorandum he had prepared without requiring, as they contend, a proper foundation therefor to be
laid. It appears that the length of time covered by the testimony taken was quite considerable, in fact, several years in
extent. The witness had from time to time over a considerable period of time and on observing airplanes flying low over
his home or near to it and over his property made notations
in whatever way was open to him at the time, consisting of a
description of the plane, its numbers and such like matters.
He made these notations on scratch paper he may have had
with him at the time. Sometimes he entered them upon fence
posts and even at times inscribed them on the surface of
the ground. He then collected these memoranda and, as he
testified, copied the same into more permanent form and
either from these latter writings or from other writings
copied from them in turn, he was permitted to testify over
objections. Section 204 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure covers
the matter. It provides that a witness is allowed to refresh
his memory by anything written by himself or under his
direction at the time when the fact occurred or immediately
thereafter or while still fresh in his memory, if he knows
the same to be correctly stated in the writing. He may also
testify from a writing, though he retain no recollection as to
the facts, but such evidence must be received with caution. . . .
[5] ''An examination of the record discloses that the witness here did make the notations himself and he testified that
he made copies of these notations. He was not asked directly
either on direct or cross-examination whether he copied them
correctly, but when a witness testifies under oath that he made
a copy it is going far afield to say that such testimony is not
equivalent to saying that he copied the memoranda correctly
since it would not be a copy unless it was correct. While it
is better, of course, to properly and fully qualify the witness
who is to testify from or with the aid of memoranda, nevertheless we do not think that what happened here would justify reversal if, indeed, error at all was committed. [6] As
to his reading the memoranda into the record, that is permitted when the code says: 'So, also, a witness may testify
from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts.' [7] Where proper foundation has been
laid the fact that the writing does not refresh the recollection
of the witness does not prevent him from testifying from the
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writing and if his recollection is not refreshed there would be
no other way to testify 'from the writing' save to read from
it verbatim.''
The record does not indicate where the following plaintiffs
reside: C. H. Terry, Oma Terry, H. E. Fletcher, Dorothy
Fletcher, William 'r. Harrison, and Grace Harrison. The
judgment as to them must therefore be reversed. The judgment must also be reversed as to plaintiffs Frank Baba and
Zale Wooters, who testified that they had not authorized
institution of this action in their names.
Of the 56 plaintiffs, only six testified at the trial. The
court denied defendants' motion to nonsuit the plaintiffs who
did not testify. The conditions described by the plaintiffs'
witnesses were common to· all plaintiffs who lived in the
immediate vicinity of the airport. The testimony was received in behalf of all the plaintiffs. The six who testified
were the plaintiffs' witnesses and the fact that these witnesses were themselves plaintiffs did not limit the benefit
of their testimony to themselves alone. The conditions they
were describing were to some extent common to all the plaintiffs since it described conditions such as low fl.ying, stunting,
indulging in acrobatics and the like which would affect those
residents in the immediate vicinity of the airport and there
was testimony that placed the other plaintiffs within that
radius.
In addition to the injunction abating operation of the airport, the trial court awarded the Harlans, the Arvid Andersons, and the Vern Andersons damages of $500 per couple
for the annoyance and discomfort caused by defendants' operations before the institution of the action. Defendants contend that these damages are unsupported by the evidence. The
testimony of the Harlans and Andersons, which is set out in
detail below, is clearly sufficient to support the awards in their
favor. (See Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal.
168, 172 [106 P. 581, 21 Ann.Cas. 1247, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 183];
Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal.App.2d 778, 787-788 [214 P.2d 50].)
The trial court awarded these three couples $500 each for
past injuries, but found that all the plaintiffs had suffered
irreparable injury and were entitled to injunctive relief.
Even though the decree must be reversed as to some plaintiffs,
the findings are not necessarily inconsistent. The plaintiffs
receiving money damages were the only plaintiffs to give
testimony. [8] The annoyance and disturbance caused by
38 C.2d-27
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low flying airplanes is very difficult to measure. The other
plaintiffs could be injured by the airplanes sufficiently to
justify equitable relief, even though their damages could not
be measured. By definition, an injunction is properly granted
where "it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount
of compensation which would afford adequate relief.'' ( Civ.
Code, § 3422.) [9] The term "irreparable injury" authorizing the interposition of a court of equity by way of injunction means that species of damages, whether great or small,
that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted
on the other. (Edelman Bros. v. Baikof!, 277 Ill.App. 432.
See, also, Greenfield v. Board of City Planning Commrs.,
6 Cal.App.2d 515, 518 [45 P.2d 219]; Espenscheid v. Bauer,
235 Ill. 172 [85 N.E. 230, 232] .)
"The final contention made by the appellants is that the
court erred in restraining defendants from operating an airport on the premises described in the complaint. This contention presents a difficult problem and to its discussion a
fuller statement of facts than has heretofore been made is
desirable. The defendant Souza owned 42 acres of land within
one mile of the limits of Turlock. In 1946 he discussed with
federal authorities the suitability of this land as an airport
site. Encouraged by what he was told, he proceeded to lay out
a landing strip and by locating a strip diagonally was able
to achieve an airstrip 2,000 feet in length, just 200 feet
beyond the minimum permitted by the United States Civil
Aeronautics Administration. He constructed a strip 300
feet wide, oiling and smoothing the surface of the ground.
Along the southerly line of his property and at the southerly
end of the strip was a public road. The property bounding
his property on the north was owned by the Andersons, their
son and his wife, and the Harlans. A great deal of testimony
concerning the location of the homes of these respondents
and the location thereof with regard to the airport was given,
along with the use of a map . . . . One of the Anderson couples
does not reside near the airport, but owns an interest in the
property of the other Anderson couple. The Anderson home
is about 500 feet from the northern boundary of the strip
and about 250 feet from the center line of the strip as extended. The Harlan house is about 500 feet from the northern
end of the strip and about 300 feet distant from the same
center line. North of the Anderson and Harlan properties
and 660 feet from the north line of the airfield there is another
public road. The public roads mentioned parallel the north
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and south boundaries of the airfield. Some of the plaintiffs
reside northerly of this northernmost road. Bounding a part
of the Souza property on the west there is another public
road across which lie the residences and property of some of
the other respondents. Others bound the field on the east. On
the southerly road defendants had signs directed to vehicular
traffic on the road reading as follows: One sign read, 'Stop,
Aircraft Crossing.' There were two of these stop signs, apparently placed to warn vehicular traffic going in either direction upon the road. Between them was a sign reading, 'No
Parking Between Signs-Look Out for Low-Flying Aircraft.'
A sign directed to aircraft in this same vicinity read, 'All
Aircraft Keep 20 to 30 Feet Above the Road.' There is considerable evidence that these warnings were appropriate and
that aircraft, in fact, flew over this road onto the airstrip
at elevations even below the 20 to 30 feet which the sign
requested. The airstrip runs approximately north and south;
the generally-prevailing wind is from the north and hence
most craft take off in that direction and on the other hand,
and for the same reason, generally land from the south.
As a part of his construction of the airport Souza invested
altogether in land and buildings some $80,000. The value of
the homes and residences of the respondents was not the subject of testimony. Although no considerable complaint seems
to have been made while the airport was being constructed,
the opposition and complaints began very shortly after the
field was put in operation. The homes of the respondents
were there before the airport was constructed. A flight pattern was laid out, after consultation with the federal authorities, which may be briefly described as follows: A plane
taking off into a north wind would rise from the strip and
fly over the property beyond its limits until it reached an
elevation of approximately 500 feet, at which time it would
turn to the west at a right angle, then turn at a right angle
south, again turn at a right angle east and then make a landing on the airstrip from the south. The pattern was approximately rectangular. A similar pattern would be followed
when a south wind was blowing and the planes took off toward
the south, this pattern being the reverse of the one just described. Planes desiring to leave the pattern would make the
first right angle turn and then proceed away from the pattern
as desired. Incoming planes would fly into the pattern and
follow it to a landing. There apparently was no restriction
as to the size or type of aircraft permitted to use the field
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and although the airfield was privately owned, nevertheless,
it was available to the flying public. At frequent intervals
planes belonging to business enterprises would arrive and
depart from the field in pursuit of their private concerns.
Souza testified that there were approximately 18 to 20 planes
hangared or tied down at the field as a fair average. The
testimony as to the frequency of flight ran all the way from
150 flights per day down to 40 or 50. Most of this flying was
during the daytime, beginning around 6 o'clock in the morning and continuing into the evening, but there were apparently no time limitations and planes would arrive and depart
during the night, makeshift landing lights being provided.
It appears that a light plane taking off to the north would
become airborne well before reaching the end of the runway.
A heavier plane would make a longer run and would sometimes
pass between the Harlan and Anderson homes with little altitude. Supportive of the court's findings that a nuisance existed, in addition to what we have already referred to, we
select the following testimony which, although contradicted
to some extent by witnesses for appellants, yet must here
be taken to be true. [10] Mrs. Neva Harlan testified that
45 or 50 planes used the field daily, many of them flying low
over her home ; that she was unable to rest during the day
because of the disturbance; that the noise was so loud she
could not understand normal conversation or hear the radio
or use the telephone when the planes went over; that night
flying awakened her; that the planes kept the family awake
and so upset they could not get back to ·sleep after being
awakened; that the children were awakened early in the morning; that when friends visited the noise drowned out conversation. Arvid Anderson, who resided away from the airfield,
but owned an interest in his son's property bordering the
field on the north, was accustomed to work about the 10-acre
farm, of which it consisted. He testified that as he worked
the planes sometimes made him so jumpy he had to leave ;
that he had to be on the constant lookout because they came in
so low that it was really dangerous; that once while running
a tractor a plane came in so low that he rolled off the tractor
because he was sure it was going to strike him; that once a
plane zoomed over him so low that he put his pitchfork up
and felt sure the fork would hit the plane; that he had noticed
planes crossing from the airfield over his property at heights
of 10, 15 or 20 feet; that some of the lighter planes went
higher, but he had seen the larger planes skim the top of
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the 6-foot fence posts along his southern boundary; that while
he had wanted to put a home for himself on the place he
could not do it and could not use the place for poultry or
turkeys because of the low flying; he was afraid to live on
the place. Irene Anderson, who lived in the An~erson home,
testified that she had made a count of the planes flying over
on certain dates; that on May 15, 1948, just before the case
was tried, 110 came over, on May 16th, 105, on Saturday,
May 22d, 101, on Sunday, May 23d, 140; that during weekdays there would be 50 a day; that flights generally began at
6 o'clock and continued until dark; that the planes greatly
affected her enjoyment of her home and family life, made her
nervous, gave her digestive upsets, scared the children. She
said 'We are just helpless, we don't have a home, we are
without anything, nothing to fight for; we are just helpless
where we are; it has just been Hell'; that she could not
enjoy radio programs because of the continual noise; that she
couldn't use the telephone, nor enjoy the visits of guests
or relatives. She said 'When they come there to see us it is
Zoom! Zoom! Zoom! just like that, all the time'; that she
was awakened early in the morning and when awakened at
night could not get to sleep again; that she had no rest and
had no peace at all; that the children were scared many times
until they were hysterical and would run into the house
screaming and crying; that her whole home was upset; that
when the airport started operating she was well. She said
'The noise from the airplanes, when I hear them from the
beginning, when they start coming off the runway and into
the field, they start the motors up, I hear them, they come
closer and closer to the house and I see them and my stomach
goes-I don't know, it just goes upside down sometimes, and
sometimes I vomit. My stomach feels like the insides are just
turned upside down-my health is-what are we going to
do?' There was considerable testimony along the same general lines. This record supports the conclusion of the trial
court that the operation of the field and the flying of the
planes as usually and normally occurring constituted a private nuisance and that in view of the increasing use of the
field this nuisance would continue and be aggravated. Both
Souza and Earlandson testified that they had continually
done all they could to prevent improper flying and it is a
fair inference that they either cannot or will not abate the
nuisance themselves. This is significant in view of the fact
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that the action had been filed on August 7, 1947, and the case
was tried beginning May 18, 1948.
[11] ''An airport is not a nuisance per se, but that it may
become a nuisance either because of unsuitable location or
improper operation or both has been clearly decided. (Thrasher
v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514 [173 S.E. 817, 99 A.L.R. 158];
2 C.J.S. (Aerial Navigation), § 29, p. 909.) Our Legislature
in 1947 passed a State Aeronautics Commission Act. It
therein declared that, 'Flight in aircraft over the lands and
waters of this State is lawful, unless at altitudes below those
prescribed by federal authority, or unless so conducted as to
be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on
the land or water beneath.' (State Aeronautics Com. Act,
§ 2(d), ch. 1379, Stats. 1947, 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
151a.) [12] While this act had not gone into effect when
the action before us was begun it went into effect approximately one month thereafter and since the injunctive processes of the court are prospective in operation it was applicable to this feature of the case. The licensing and regulation
of airports, subject to federal control, is committed by the
act to the State Aeronautics Commission. [13] Nevertheless the licensing of the airport by the commission does not
confer the right to so operate the port as to constitute a private nuisance to surrounding property owners.
" ' . . . A license granted by a state aeronautics commission for the operation of an airport does not confer upon
the proprietor thereof the right to operate it in such a manner
as to constitute it a private nuisance.' (2 C.J.S. (Aerial Navigation) § 29, p. 909.)
"While apparently no formal license had up to the time
of trial been granted to this airport, nevertheless since it was
operative prior to June 30, 1947, it comes under the so-called
'grandfather clause' of the State Aeronautics Commission Act,
Section 17, which provides that 'Airport site approvals shall
be granted and airport permits shall be issued for any improved airports in use or ready for use on June 30, 1947.'
We shall treat the airport as a licensed or permitted airport.
[14] "Further, as to the effect of regulations concerning
flying operations, it has been held that such regulations
do not determine the rights of the surface owners as to nuisance. (Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., [C.C.A. Ohio]
55 F.2d201, 203 [83 A.L.R. 319]), a ruling which is in line
with the general principle above stated that permits and
licenses are not to be considered as granting leave to maintain
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a private nuisance. It is not controlling that the federal
government has declared that the United States of America
possesses and exercises complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space above the United States (U.S.C.A.,
title 49, § 176a) and that our Legislature has said 'It is further declared that sovereignty in the space above the lands
and waters of this State is declared to rest in the State, except
where granted to and assumed by the United States pursuant
to a constitutional grant from the people of the State' (State
Aeronautics Com. Act, § 2 (b)), for it must be said that these
declarations were not intended to and do not divest owners
of the surface of the soil of their lawful rights incident to
ownership.
'' 'There is no definite yardstick that may be used in determining how low an airplane may fly over the property of
others in landing or taking off; however, flying at low altitudes
incident to landing and taking off may constitute trespass,
as it may cause more than mere apprehension of injury. And,
extensive low flying, causing unreasonable annoyanee to oceupants of land below, is a substantial interferenee with enjoyment of the property.' (Brandes v. JJ1itterling, 67 Ariz. 349
[196 P.2d 464].)
[15] "The regulatory provisions of the State Aeronauties
Commission Act and the federal laws referred to do 'not supplant the aneient common law and long-established statute law
deelaring that nuisanees may be abated at the suit of those
injured thereby. Restatement of the Law of Torts, seetion
194, provides:
'' 'An entry above the surfaee of the earth, in the air
spaee in the possession of another, by a person who is traveling in an aireraft, is privileged if the flight is condueted
'' ' (a) for the purpose of travel through the air spaee
or for any other legitimate purpose,
" ' (b) in a reasonable manner,
'' ' (e) at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably
with the possessor's enjoyment of the surfaee of the earth
and the air space above it, and
"'(d) in conformity with such regulations of the State
and federal aeronautieal authorities as are in force in the
particular State.'
"But:
" 'Under the rule stated in this Section, only those flights
are privileged which are eonducted at such a height as not
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unreasonably to interfere with the possessory interest in the
land. Thus, a flight, although otherwise conducted in a reasonable manner, for a legitimate purpose, and in conformity
with all applicable local regulations, if conducted at such a
low height as to cause reasonable fear or substantial annoyance to occupants of the land or to frighten cattle or other
animals thereon in such a way as to cause them harm, or to
endanger the surface of the land, or persons, trees, structures
or other things thereon, or to interfere with the possessor's
legitimate use of the air space, is not within the privilege.'
(Comment on clause (c) of § 194.)
''As illustrative of the general trend of judicial decisions
upon the subject hereof see the following: Thrasher v. City
of Atlanta, supra (judgment reversed with directions to issue
injunction against continued spreading of dust in excessive
or unreasonable quantities over adjoining residential property; Bur·nham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628 [ 42
N.E.2d 575) (decree affirmed, upholding injunction against
flying below height of 500 feet over residence 2,800 feet from
city-controlled, but privately-operated, airport); Mohican &
Reena, Inc. v. Tobiasz, 1938 U.S.Av.Rep. 1 (injunction granted
at suit of owner of summer camp for children· against flying
below 1,000 feet within 500 feet of camp) ; Vanderslice v.
Shawn, 26 Del.Ch. 225 [27 A.2d 87) (residents entitled to an
injunction against owners of private airport from permitting
flights at less that 100 feet of adjacent dwellings) ; Alhambra
Airport case, 13 J. of Air L. & Com. 138 (injunction at suit of
taxpayers and board of education prohibiting further use of
private airport for pilot training and limiting future use to
emergency landings and actual business needs of two aircraft
manufacturing plants located at airport) ; Dlugos v. United Air
Lines, 1944 U.S.Av.Rep. (Ct. Com. Pl. Pa. Lehigh Co., 1944)
airline enjoined from operating planes at altitudes below 100
feet over plaintiff's fields adjacent to municipal airport, on
days when plaintiff engaged in farming such fields, not to exceed10 days during following year, provided five hours' written notice given airline at its office) ; Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corp., s~tpra (airport completely abated by circuit
court, notwithstanding refusal of trial court to do so.)
''A further contention is made that the trial court still was
not authorized to enjoin the further operation of the airport
and necessarily must have limited its injunctive order to
prevention of the nuisance existing; that this could be done
without forbidding all operation of the airport. [16] In-
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junctive process ought never to go beyond the necessities of
the case and where a legitimate business is being conducted
and in the conduct thereof a nuisance has been created and
is being maintained, the relief granted should be directed
and confined to the elimination of the nuisance, unless under
the peculiar circumstances of the case the business, lawful in
itself, cannot be conducted without creating a nuisance and
violating the rights of contiguous property owners. In Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 216 Cal. 156, 162 [13 P.2d 733],
in a case involving a decree ordering defendant to cease operating a number of pottery kilns, the court said:
" 'In the present case the court appears to have given due
consideration to the situation of the defendant. This is apparent from the fact that it refused to abate entirely the
defendant's operations and granted the relief sought to the
extent necessary to preserve the rights of both parties. In
other words the court, in the exercise of its equity powers,
has compared consequences and has considered the injuries
resulting to each party, on the one hand if the injunction
be wholly denied, and on the other if it be granted. The
court, from the evidence presented, gave heed to the rule
that in a proper case it will not enjoin the conduct of the
defendant's entire business, where such business is not a
nuisance per se, if a less measure of restriction will afford
to the plaintiff the relief to which he may be entitled. (McMenamy v. Baud, 87 Cal. 134 [26 P. 795] ; Tuebner v. California St. R. Co., 66 Cal. 171 [4 P. 1162]; Williams v. Blue
Bird Laundry Co., supra [85 Cal.App. 388 (259 P. 484)] ;
Mcintosh v. Brimmer, supra [68 Oal.App. 770 (230 P. 203) J.) '
"In this case it is apparent from the memorandum opinion
written by the able trial judge, on motion for new trial, that
it was his conclusion nothing short of complete abatement
would preserve the rights of respondents and he attributed
this principally to the shortness of the runway. The learned
trial judge said:
" 'The third contention, that the injunction was too broad,
is a more difficult question. Ordinarily it is true that a lawful
act should not be enjoined; that all that should be enjoined
is the commission of the act in such a way as to constitute
a nuisance; in other words, that only the nuisance should be
enjoined. Under that interpretation, defendants ask to be
allowed to continue operations provided they commit no
nuisance. But in the Court's opinion, that is impossible. The
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continued operation of that field in its present condition,
according to the evidence, must inevitably result in continuance of the nuisance. The field is entirely too small to avoid
the nuisance; and the runway is too close to the homes of some
of the plaintiffs.'
[17] "Pertinent to the problem now being discussed is
the nature of the airfield involved. It is a private airfield
which cannot exercise the power of condemnation and the
establishment of which requires no finding by any public
agency of public convenience and necessity. [18] The owners and operators of such an airport, notwithstanding they
are engaged in a legitimate business, the encouragement and
furtherance of which is a publicly-declared policy of our
Legislature (State .Aeronautics Com . .Act, § 2(a)) [see, also,
Deering's Gen. Laws, .Acts 153c and 153e] must nevertheless
conduct it with due regard for the rights of others, and if
because of location the operation of such a business will result
in depriving others of their property rights, . it cannot be
permitted, for to do so would, in practical effect, condemn
the property of others in violation of constitutional guarantees. (Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal.
239 [118 P. 928, 38 L.R..A.N.S. 436].)
''The distinction between a public and private use as regards the use of injunctive process is pointed out in New
York City v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93 [22 S.Ct. 592, 46 L.Ed. 820],
wherein the Supreme Court of the United States recognized
the principle that, where the defendant in an injunction
suit has the ultimate right, that is to say, where it is entitled
to continue with its work by eminent domain proceedings, a
permanent injunction will be denied, but a temporary injunction may be granted to compel the defendant to make compensation. The State .Aeronautics Commission .Act contemplates the furtherance of aviation, with its manifold benefits
to the public, by operation of both public and private fields,
but with respect to the public fields it provides for their establishment by counties, cities and other municipal agencies,
requires the finding of public convenience and necessity and
contemplates the use of the power of condemnation. No such
power is given or could be given to those putting their property to private use, even though incidentally the general purposes of the act are thereby subserved. [19] We conclude
there is nothing to distinguish a private airport from any other
private business with regard to enjoining operations which
create a nuisance.
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''However, we are still confronted with the final question
of whether or not the record here and the findings of the
trial court itself support the issuanee of the decree completely forbidding the continued use of the property involved
as an airfield.
"The allegations in the complaint which have been heretofore stated indicate clearly that it is the way in which the
flying has been done that constitutes the nuisance complained
of. Considering these allegations, the following things must
be said: That buzzing, stunting and engaging in acrobatics
can be prohibited without difficulty. The allegations that
planes taxi, take off, circle, cruise about, maneuver, glide,
climb, bank and turn are descriptions of ordinary and necessary actions in flying a plane, not objectionable unless conducted in such close proximity to plaintiffs' homes as to
constitute a nuisance. It is the way they are being done and
not the doing of them in and of itself which is the cause for
complaint. It is the doing of these things at such low altitudes
and in such close proximity to plaintiffs' homes and property
that is the gravamen of the cause. Limits could be placed
upon the doing of these acts which would eliminate the nuisance. [20] Plaintiffs also plead that 'the only available
remedy to Plaintiffs, . . . is a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants permanently from operating the said airport as an airport,' but this is said to be necessary 'because
of the peculiar acts of the Defendants.' While all these allegations were found to be true by the trial court we think that
neither the pleadings nor the findings justify the complete
abatement of the enterprise; and that the testimony does not
support the extreme decree granted."
[21] Defendants maintained throughout the case that their
ordinary operations did not constitute a nuisance and therefore offered no evidence or suggestions as to how the airport
could be operated without constituting a nuisance. Although
they were in error in concluding that their operations did not
constitute a nuisance, the burden was on plaintiffs who sought
to close the airport to prove that no planes could fly to and
from the field at proper elevations.
"No witness testified planes could not fly to and from the
field and still fly at such elevations as would eliminate the
nuisance factor which now exists. [22] Contiguous property owners must to a reasonable degree yield their desired
privacy to the general welfare which is contributed to by the
operation of legitimate businesses. Were it not so, railroads
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could not operate near residences, and factories could not be
established without the necessity of purchasing prohibitively
large areas of property. That reasonable inconvenience must
be suffered by owners whose holdings are contiguous to commercial enterprises is too well decided to require citation of
authorities. The evidence shows that the length of the runway
here, while approximating the lowest limit fixed by federal
authority, yet does exceed that limit. [23] We are aware
that airplanes necessarily ascend and descend on rising and
descending planes and that where a runway is too short to
permit them to ascend or descend over contiguous property
without invading the lawful right of the surface owner to the
air above his holdings their flight would constitute an unlawful act. Nevertheless there is no testimony here that the
runway is so short that no planes could lawfully operate
from the field. That such was the situation in the opinion
of the learned trial judge appears from that part of his
written opinion which we have quoted, but the evidence does
not sustain that position. We think, therefore, that upon
this record here, considering the evidence, the pleadings and
the findings, the decree rendered went beyond permissible
limits. · [24] 'It may be that the imposition of appropriate
limitations will, by reason of the shortness of the runway,
and the prevailing flying conditions, make it impossible for
the airfield to be operated in a normal and usual manner,
but that has not been shown; and until it is the injunction
forbidding all operations from the field cannot be sustained.
It may be difficult, but we think it is not impossible for the
trial court either upon the evidence now in the record, or to
be taken, to frame a decree which will eliminate the nuisance
that has been shown to exist. . . . '' For example, flight over
the homes of plaintiffs at elevations below those set by federal
authority could be forbidden; flight by flyers unable to comply
with such a regulation by reason of inexperience could be
forbidden; use of the airport by any type or size of aircraft
for which the court on competent evidence finds the airport
inadequate, could be forbidden; flight except during daylight
hours could be forbidden if necessary; if defendants cannot
comply with such restrictions all operations from the field
could be forbidden. Complete abatement of the enterprise
is undoubtedly the result plaintiffs desire, but, in the absence
of a showing that the airport and flying school could not be
operated in such a way as not to constitute a nuisance, complete abatement is beyond the rights of plaintiffs ..
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The advance of aeronautical science may make use of the
field possible without injury to plaintiffs, by aircraft that
can operate without making unduly low and noisy flights.
Defendants may acquire additional land and extend their runway. Upon a proper showing of changed circumstances, the
trial court may modify or dissolve the injunction. (Sontag
Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 92 [113 P.2d
689); see cases collected in 28 Am.Jur. 485-495.)
The judgment for damages is affirmed. The judgment is
reversed as to plaintiffs C. H. Ter:ry, Oma Terry, H. E.
Fletcher, Dorothy Fletcher, ·william T. Harrison, Grace
Harrison, Frank Baba, and Zale Wooters. That part of
the judgment enjoining and restraining the defendants from
operating the airport on the premises is reversed and the
cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
in harmony with the views expressed in this opinion. Costs
are awarded to plaintiffs.
SCHAUER, J.-Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the reversal of the judgment as to plaintiffs
Terry, Fletcher, Harrison, Baba and Wooters, and in the
reversal of the part of the judgment which restrains defendants from operating the airport. I agree that the cause should
be remanded for further proceedings in accord with the view
that'' Contiguous property owners must to a reasonable degree
yield their desired privacy to the general welfare which is
contributed to by the operation of legitimate businesses. Were
it not so, railroads could not operate near residences, and
factories could not be established without the necessity of
purchasing prohibitively large areas of property. That reasonable inconvenience must be suffered by owners whose holdings are contiguous to commercial enterprises is too well
decided to require citation of authorities.''
An airport is just as lawful, just as much in the public
interest and as necessary for its convenience, as a garage or
a service station, and a school of aeronautics is just as lawful
and serves the public interest as truly as any other school
which teaches a useful art or science or craft. Such activities
may constitute ''a substantial interference with enjoyment
of the property'' which is in proximity to the places where
they are carried on, but it is only an interference which is
unreasonable under all the circumstances that can be enjoined. (See, e.g., Nagel v. Darrington (1927), 202 Cal. 698,
700 [262 P. 718], refusing to enjoin operation of garage and
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service station in the absence of a showing that "it is operated
in some extraordinary manner so as to be a nuisance because
of such operation.'')
I dissent from the affirmance of the judgment for damages
against Souza, owner of the airstrip, and his wife. In my
opinion the evidence does not support the findings that the
Souzas operated the airport and that Souza operated "many"
planes from it. Souza testified that he did not operate the
airport; that he had leased it to Earlandson, who, under the
terms of the lease, had the exclusive right to operate it. Mr.
Souza collected rent fro~n Earlandson and from the owners
of some 18 planes which were kept at the field. There is no
evidence that Souza controlled the operation of ·these planes
which regularly occupied space at the airport or that these
particular planes were operated in a manner which was
legitimately objectionable to any plaintiff. Souza did not lease
the land for any improper purpose; he leased it for the
lawful, useful purposes of the operation of a flying school,
the storing of planes, and the servicing of planes which used
the field. Souza did not operate "many" planes; he owned
and operated only one plane and there is no evidence that
he himself ever used his airport or his airplane unlawfully
or in such a manner as to interfere with any plaintiff's use
and enjoyment of plaintiffs' land.
Would it be reasonable to hold that the owner of property
used as a garage, for the storing and repair of automobiles,
is to be liable for damages and for abatement of the use of
his property if owners of the automobiles stored or serviced
at his garage drive them on the highways in such a manner
as to violate the law and constitute a nuisance~ If the owner
of garage property is not to be held to such an extended
degree of responsibility for the independent acts of his patrons
then neither should the owner of an airport. The liability
here of Mr. and Mrs. Souza rests on no better foundation.
It is relatively but a few years since courts-and, of course,
the citizenry at large who brought the cases to court-were
struggling with a new concept: the use of public highways
by self-propelled vehicles. Illustrative of the difficulties encountered then is Nason v. West (1900), 31 Misc. 583 [65
N.Y.S. 651, 652-653], an action for damages which resulted
when plaintiffs' horse was frightened by defendant's carefully
driven motor carriage. The court said : "It will not do to
say that it is proper to run any kind of a contrivance upon
the street, in which persons may be carried. A machine that
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would go puffing and snorting through the streets, trailing
clouds of steam and smoke, might be a nuisance; but this is
not such a case. It cannot be said that the defendant's machine
is such a departure in its construction or mode of operation
from other steam motor carriages, which experience has lately
shown to be entirely practicable for street use, as to make it a
nuisance, although, because of the present novelty of horseless
carriages, horses may take fright at its approach." Judgment
for the plaintiffs was reversed.
The thought that privately owned automobiles might be
generally barred from public highways is now archaic. So
also is the thought that privately owned surface vessels might
be generally barred from the use of navigable waters. But
there are still many people who have not yet accepted the
concept that the navigable sea of the air is a public domain
and that ''Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of
this state is lawful, unless at altitudes below those prescribed
by federal authority, or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land
or water beneath." (State Aeronautics Com. Act, § 2 (b), ch.
1379, Stats. 1947, 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 151a.) Only
a couple of decades ago pilots often heard the statement (which
almost became an adage) that "One doesn't have to be crazy
to fly but it helps.'' There are people who still believe this.
But the magnificent records of safe, speedy and comfortable
transportation through the use of airplanes, made by both
airline companies and conservative private owners, have disproved the "adage."
The published records of the Civil Aeronautics Authority
disclose that (as of February 1, 1952) there were 88,275 civil
aircraft registered in the United States, of which 1,258 were
scheduled air carrier aircraft and 87,017 were privately owned
and operated in other than scheduled air carrier operations.
Every one of these 88,275 airplanes must have airports from
and to which to operate; the utility of each can be no greater
than the available take off and landing facilities. By reason
of size, weight and other limitations, the 1,258 scheduled air
carrier aircraft are limited to the use of relatively very large
and highly improved airports but the great majority of the
87,017 privately owned and operated airplanes are built to
take off and land on much smaller fields. The loss of any
approved and established airport-small or large-is a loss
to the people of the entire state. As declared in ''California
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Airport Study" ( 1950), prepared by the California Aeronautics Commission, ''Aviation's part in California's growth
is large. The State has accepted the aircraft as an important
means of transportation, and as a new tool of agriculture.
Airports must be provided on a permanent and equitable
basis. Detailed study of the inventory of the State's airports
and careful consideration of the specific needs of the various
counties and cities, individually and collectively, leads to certain broad conclusions. These are:
''An airport is a part of a state-wide transportation system
and serves all of the people of the State-not just those
who live in the immediate vicinity of the terminal.
"The 'highway system of the air' will not give full service
nor show adequate returns until it is completed.
''To keep California abreast of national progress a definite,
integrated, program must be instituted to establish the system.
"The problem confronting the people of the State of California at the present time is the establishment of a SYSTEM
of airports on a permanent basis in order to realize the full
benefit to be derived from aviation.
''The terrain will force the use of the airplane for rapid
and economic travel in many areas. The distances between
the State's major areas of population will demand transportation means faster than can be accomplished on the surface.
''Many airports are needed to adequately serve populated
areas.
''Airports are needed to give access to the many fine
existing recreational areas, and to develop others that are
not otherwise accessible.
''Isolated airports are required to complete the system.
''Some airports are needed to save lives.''
Returning more particularly to the law applicable to this
case I would emphasize that neither noise alone (see Smith
v. New England Aircraft Co. (1930), 270 Mass. 511 [170
N.E. 385, 69 A.L.R. 300, 306] ; Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey
(1942), 193 Ga. 862 [20 S.E.2d 245, 140 A.L.R. 1352, 1356];
Crew v. Gallagher (1948), 358 Pa. 541, 548 [58 A.2d 179]),
nor mere apprehension of danger of falling airplanes (see
Thrasher v. Atlanta (1934), 178 Ga. 514 [173 S.E. 817, 99
A.L.R. 158, 163] ; Batcheller v. Commonwealth (1940), 176
Va. 109, 117 [10 S.E.2d 529] )-the two elements of which
particular complaint is made in the testimony of those plaintiffs who took the stand in support of the allegations of the
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complaint- are sufficient grounds for enjoining the operation
of an airport.
In the state of the evidence here I would hold that the
Souzas are within the rule of such cases as Meloy v. City of
Santa Monica (1932), 124 Cal.App. 622, 627 [12 P.2d 1072],
and Mundt v. Nowlin (1941), 44 Cal.App.2d 414, 416 [112
P.2d 782), that a landlord is not liable for a nuisance created
by lessees who have leased the land for lawful and proper
purposes. It was not shown that a nuisance is a necessary
consequence of the operation of the flying school and airport
here. The lessor should not be liable for their operation in
a manner which he did not contemplate and to which he did
not consent.
Earlandson states that he has no objection to any unlawful .
or improper actions being enjoined. Earlandson is liable )
only for unlawful use of the airport which he could control.
Since there is evidence tending to show that planes of
Earlandson 's flying school, inferentially controlled by him,
often passed over the land of plaintiffs at unnecessarily low
altitudes when taking off, the finding against Earlandson on
this point can be upheld, but the relief adjudged against him
should go no further than the ends of equity, upon the proof,
may require.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I agree with everything in the majority opmwn of this
court except its conclusion that a permanent injunction should
not have been granted. The trial judge who heard the evidence, saw the witnesses, and viewed the maps and photographs, was of the opinion that the airfield could not be so
operated that it would not constitute a continuing nuisance
as to plaintiffs.
Inherent in the majority opinion is the premise that plaintiffs had clearly shown that a nuisance existed as it undoubtedly did and will continue to exist. The trial court
was of the opinion that the continued operation of the field
"in 1:ts present condition, according to the evidence, (note
that it was not only the manner in which the planes were
operated) must inevitably result in continuance of the nuisance. The field is entirely too small to avoid the nuisance;
and the runway is too close to the homes of some of the
plaintiffs." (Italics added.) Having heard the evidence, the
trial judge was in a position to know that a permanent m-
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junction was necessary to preserve the rights of these plaintiffs .
.A majority of this court, however, feels that this is much too
drastic a step and reverses that portion of the judgment.
The landing strip on the airfield is laid out diagonally. The
airstrip is 2,000 feet in length, just 200 feet beyond the
minimum permitted by the United States Civil .Aeronautics
.Administration. The majority states that there is no testimony to show that the runway is so short that planes could
not lawfully operate from the field. .Apparently the testimony
was all to the effect that no planes did lawfully operate from
the field and it is stated by a majority of this court that
although defendants testified "that they had continually done
all they could to prevent improper flying . . . it is a fair
inference that they either cannot or will not abate the nuisance
themselves. This is significant in view of the fact that the
action had been filed on .August 7, 1947, and the case was
tried beginning May 18, 1948." (Italics added.) It is conceded that a nuisance existed; that the plaintiffs proved their
case, but the judgment granting a permanent injunction is
reversed. The reason assigned for this conclusion is that
plaintiffs have not shown that it is impossible for the airfield
to be "operated in a normal and usual manner." If this
is stated in another way, it means that plaintiffs are required
to prove what defendants sh01lld be required to prove: That
the airport can be so operated as not to create a nuisance.
The injunction having been granted, it appears to me that
it is now up to the defendants to prove that they are prepared
to so operate their admittedly lawful business as to comply
with the regulations this court has decided will constitute
a lawful operation thereof. For example, "flight over the
homes of plaintiffs at elevations below those set by federal
authority cmlld be forbidden; flight by flyers unable to comply
with such a regulation by reason of inexperience could be
forbidden; use of the airport by any type or size of aircraft
for which the court on competent evidence finds the airport
inadequate, could be forbidden; flight except during daylight
hours could be forbidden if necessary''; and ''the advance
of aeronautical science may make use of the field possible
without injury to plaintiffs . . . defendants may acquire
additional land and extend their runway." And, as a complete answer, it is stated that "upon a proper showing of
changed circumstances, the trial court may modify or dissolve
the injunction"-this undoubtedly refers to the "further
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proceedings in harmony with the views expressed in the (majority) opinion.'' (Italics added.)
It appears to me that under the "views expressed," plaintiffs now must show defendants how to try to lawfully operate
their airfield. 'l'hen, if the nuisance continues to exist, they
must again go to court, prove the existence of the nuisance
and receive money damages and a permanent injunction
which would, in turn, probably be again reversed by a majority of this court. Up until now, it had always been my
understanding that a single suit in equity took the place of
many successive suits at law for damages with the court of
equity ending by injunction the violation of the plaintiff's
rights which, together with recovery of damages sustained,
settled the entire controversy in a single suit. Damages are
clearly inadequate here; a permanent injunction is the only
thing which will give plaintiffs the relief they seek, and the
only thing which will prevent a multiplicity of suits.
It appears to me that the result reached by a majority
of this court is in direct conflict with the usual procedure.
It is uniformly recognized that where a final or permanent
injunction has been granted, the court which granted it may
dissolve or modify it where changes in circumstances or conditions warrant it (Santa Rita Oil Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, (Mont.) 116 P.2d 1012, 136 A.L.R. 757; Ladner
v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487 [148 A. 699, 68 A.L.R. 1172]; Washington Water Power Co. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, (Idaho) 24
F.Supp. 790; Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Court, 18
Cal.2d 92 [113 P.2d 689] ; J[elley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337 [190
A. 140]; Hodges v. Snyde1·, 45 S.D. 149 [186 N.W. 867, 25
A.L.R. 1128], 261 U.S. 600 [43 S.Ct. 435, 67 L.Ed. 819];
Equity, deFuniak, § 8, p. 19.)
In the Sontag case (p. 94), this court in discussing a permanent injunction had this to say: ''This is so because the
decree, although purporting on its face to be permanent, is
in essence of an executory or continuing nature, creating no
right but merely assuming to protect a right from unlawful
and injurious interference. Such a decree, it has uniformly
been held, is always subject, upon a proper showing, to modification or dissolution by the court which rendered it. The
court's power in this respect is an inherent one." This would
appear to be particularly applicable to the instant case. When,
and if, the defendants can show that they are able to so
operate their airfield as to respect plaintiffs' property rights,
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then the court which granted the injunction may modify or
dissolve it. This procedure places the burden where it belongs-on the ones who have created, and who continue to
create, the nuisance complained of. The numerous ways in
which the airport could be operated so as not to interfere
with plaintiffs' rights (as pointed out in the majority opinion,
and which I have heretofore set forth) would seem to be
innovations which defendants could put into practice before
applying for modification or dissolution of the injunction.
In effect, the majority says to plaintiffs: You have proven
sufficient facts to show that the manner in which defendants
have operated their airport constitutes a nuisance, and you
have been damaged thereby, but defendants may be able to
change their method of .operation so as to eliminate the objectionable features and thereby discontinue the nuisance.
Therefore, without any assurance that defendants will do
so, we will deprive you of the protection afforded by the
injunction and will force yott to again apply to the trial
court for such protection, and if the trial court grants it,
we may again reverse the judgment, in the hope that defendants may, at some time in the future, change their method
of operation so as to make their operation lawful. This may
continue ad infinitum.
The holding of the majority in this case marks a clear
departure from the settled course of procedure, as it places
the burden on plaintiffs to press their claim for relief or
suffer from the continuance of the nuisance. As I have
hereinabove pointed out, if the injunctive provisions of the
instant judgment are affirmed, defendants are not thereby
prevented from so changing their method of operation as to
eliminate the nuisance, if this can be done. At such time
they may apply to the court for such relief as they may be
entitled. to receive. In the meantime, plaintiffs are protected
from the continuance of the nuisance and the consequent
damage to their property which the injunction was issued to
prevent.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment.

